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ILLUMINATING A BUREAUCRATIC SHADOW
WORLD: PRECEDENT DECISIONS UNDER
CALIFORNIA'S REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT1
Michael Douglas Jacobs
SUMMARY
This article discusses the significance and effect of California's re-
cently enacted Administrative Precedent Decision Statute, Government
Code Section 11425.60.2 Section 11425.60 authorizes agencies gov-
erned by the adjudication provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act to designate decisions containing significant legal or policy deter-
minations as precedents.3 The statute expressly prohibits reliance on a
decision as precedent unless the agency has designated the decision as
precedential and indexed the decision in a publicly available list of
agency precedents.4 This article examines the nature of administrative
precedent and the bounds of adjudicatory lawmaking discretion under
Section 11425.60.5 This article contends that Section 11425.60 grants
agencies the power to evolve through case-by-case adjudication, and
that standards of general application have the same force and effect as
regulations.6 Furthermore, this article contends that judicious exercise
of the authority vested in Section 11425.607 will facilitate public and
1. This article is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Judicial
Studies degree program at the University of Nevada, Reno. I am grateful to James T.
Richardson, Elizabeth Francis, Daniel P. Ryan, and Stephen P. Angelides for their counsel
and valuable comments on the manuscript. I am also indebted to Jennifer Gee, Stephen E.
Hjelt, Nathaniel Sterling, Melvin Fong, Heather Cline Hoganson, Melissa G. Crowell, Karl
S. Engeman, Joshua S. Ben-Yehuda, Jerry L. Whitfield, Herbert F. Bolz, the editors and staff
of the Journal of the NAALJ, and Barbara A. Jacobs, for their gracious assistance.
2. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11425.60 (West Supp. 2001).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See infra pp. 265-67.
6. See infra pp. 281-83.
7. CAL. GOv'TCODE § 11425.60 (West Supp. 2001).
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agency compliance with agency regulatory policies, advance the goals
of equity and consistency in adjudicatory decision making, and promote
agency accountability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the California Legislature enacted Government Code Section
11425.608 as part of a comprehensive reform of the California Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's ("APA") adjudication provisions.9  Section
8. All undesignated statutory provisions cited in this article refer to California Govern-
ment Code Sections. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.60 (West Supp. 2001), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
9. The 1995 APA legislation was enacted on the recommendation of the California
Law Revision Commission, a statutory body charged with responsibility to examine Califor-
nia statutory and common law and to make recommendations on needed reforms. CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 8289 (West Supp. 2001). The 1995 reform legislation evolved from a con-
current resolution of the Legislature directing the Commission to study and make recom-
mendations on administrative law. 1987 Cal. Stat. Res. Ch. 47 (24). The Commission began
the study in 1990 and submitted its recommendation on adjudication reforms in January
1995. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION BY STATE AGENCIES, 25 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N
REPORTS 55, 79 (1995). See generally CAL. GOv'TCODE § 11374-11500 (West Supp. 1992).
The 1995 legislation became operative on July 1, 1997. The reform measures, contained in
APA chapters 4.5 and 5, expand and modernize the APA and constitute the first major legis-
lative changes to administrative adjudication since California adopted the APA in 1945. For
a behind-the-scenes account of the APA reform process, see Michael Asimow, Speed Bumps
11425.60 requires state agencies, governed by APA adjudication l° pro-
visions, to designate a decision11 or part of a decision that contains a
significant and recurring legal or policy determination of general appli-
cation as precedent. 12 In addition, Section 11425.60 requires state agen-
cies, governed by APA adjudication provisions, to maintain a publicly
available index of their precedents. 13 A decision may not be relied on as
precedent unless it is designated as precedential and indexed by the
agency as provided in Section 11425.60.14
Section 11425.60 expressly exempts the designation of precedent de-
cisions from APA rulemaking requirements and declares that an
agency's designation of a decision as precedential "is not rulemaking."'15
The section immunizes an agency's designation of a decision as prece-
dential or its failure to do so from judicial review, 16 granting agencies
absolute discretion to decide which legal and policy determinations are
significant and merit precedential treatment. Section 11425.60 expressly
applies prospectively, to decisions issued on or after July 1, 1997, but
also authorizes agencies to designate earlier decisions as precedents. 17
Section 11425.60 requires agencies to update the index of their prece-
dent decisions at least annually, unless the agency has not designated a
precedent since the most recent index update. 18 The agency must make
the index available to the public by subscription and annually publicize
on the Road to Administrative Law Reform in California and Pennsylvania, 8 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 229 (1999). Professor Asimow served as the California Law Revision Commis-
sion's principal consultant on the administrative law project and the 1995 legislative reforms
reflect his immense scholarship. Id. at 231.
10. The APA defines "adjudicative proceeding" as "[aln evidentiary hearing for deter-
mination of facts pursuant to which an agency formulates and issues a decision." CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 11405.20 (West Supp. 2001).
11. The APA defines "decision" as "[a]n agency action of specific application that de-
termines a legal right, duty, privilege, immunity, or other legal interest of a particular per-
son." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11405.50 (West Supp. 2001).
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.60(c), (b) (West Supp. 2001).
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.60(c) (West Supp. 2001).
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11425.10(a)(7), .60(a) (West Supp. 2001).
15. As used in this article, the term "rulemaking" denotes the formal process of adopt-
ing and promulgating administrative regulations. The APA defines "regulation" as, "[e]very
rule, regulation, order, or standard of general application or the amendment, supplement, or
revision of any rule, regulation, order, or standard adopted by any state agency to implement,
interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure,
except one that relates only to the internal management of the state agency." CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 11342.600 (West Supp. 2001).
16. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11342.600 (West Supp. 2001).
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.60(d) (West Supp. 2001).
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.60(c) (West Supp. 2001).
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its availability in the California Regulatory Notice Register. 19 Most pri-
vate litigants involved in administrative adjudicatory proceedings will
not have a subscription to precedent decision indices or know of the ex-
istence of the register. To further improve public access to agency case
law, the legislature should amend the APA to require agencies to publish
their precedent decisions or the indices of their precedents on the Inter-
net.
20
Section 11425.60 represents the California APA's first explicit recog-
nition of adjudication as an authoritative mechanism for certifying new
law and policy. Administrative common law, however, has long re-
garded adjudicatory lawmaking as a legitimate attribute of integrated
administrative powers.21  The United States Supreme Court stated,
"[w]ithin traditional agencies - that is, agencies possessing a unitary
structure - adjudication operates as an appropriate mechanism not only
for fact-finding, but also for the exercise of delegated lawmaking pow-
ers, including lawmaking by interpretation." 22  Professor Thomas
Merrill contends that the power of administrative agencies to interpret
19. Id. The CALIFORNIA REGULATORY NOTICE REGISTER, published by the California
Office of Administrative Law, contains notices of proposed action by state agencies to adopt,
amend, or repeal regulations promulgated in the California Code of Regulations. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 11346.4 (West Supp. 2001), available at http://www.oal.ca.gov/notice.htm
(last visited Jan. 16, 2002).
20. Several California agencies publish their precedent decisions on the Internet. For
example, the California Department of Social Services, Community Care Licensing Divi-
sion's Web site, which contains an explanation of precedent decisions, displays the agency's
precedent index, and provides links for downloading copies of the agency's precedents.
California Community Care Licensing Division, at http://ccld.ca.gov/docs/precedent-
cover.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2002). Other agencies that make their precedent decisions
available on the Internet include the Employment Development Department, at
http://www.edd.ca.gov/txprecdt/txpdnl.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2002); California Public
Employees Retirement System, at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/about/board/decision/preced/
preced.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2002); Public Employment Relations Board, at
http://www.perb.ca.gov/html/decisions.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2002); California Depart-
ment of Insurance, at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/docs/FS-Legal.htm (last visited Jan. 16,
2002) and California Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Board, at
http://www.dir.ca.gov/ oshab/decisions/DAR_Decisions.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2002). A
statute mandating Internet publication of precedents would complement the existing APA
provision requiring the California Office of Administrative Law to make available free of
charge on the Internet the text of the California Code of Regulations, the official compilation
of all state agency regulations. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 11344(a) (West Supp. 2001).
21. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), Weiss v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 256 P.3d 1 (Cal. 1953).
22. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 154
(1991).
the law is inherent in the executive branch's constitutional authority.
23
Agencies make law through the adjudicatory mode whenever decision-
makers construe ambiguous enactments or determine whether broadly
drawn legal standards apply to the facts of specific cases.24 Administra-
tors routinely engage in interpretive lawmaking to make statutes and
regulations practicable, understandable, and responsive to societal
needs.25  In Justice Cardozo's words, "[t]here are gaps to be filled.
There are doubts and ambiguities to be cleared. There are hardships and
wrongs to be mitigated if not avoided." 26
23. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969
(1992). Professor Merrill asserts federal agency interpretive powers derive from the Consti-
tution's grant of "executive power" to the President and its mandate the President shall see
that the laws are "faithfully executed." Id. at 1004 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3).
The California Constitution contains similar language: "The supreme executive power of this
State is vested in the Governor. The Governor shall see that the law is faithfully executed."
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1. According to Merrill,
The conferral of these powers would seem to presuppose that the President and
those who serve under [the President's] direction have the capacity to ascertain
the meaning of the law. Indeed, law interpretation is an inevitable and necessary
byproduct of the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive
branch. Just as courts must interpret the law in order to resolve cases and contro-
versies that arise within their jurisdiction, so executive officials must interpret the
law in order to promulgate regulations, bring enforcement actions, instruct em-
ployees how to carry out programs, or perform any of the other myriad tasks en-
trusted to agencies. In fact, because only a fraction of executive actions end up in
court, administrative actors engage in law interpretation with greater frequency
and over a wider range of cases than courts do. If only the courts had the capacity
to interpret law, our system of government could not continue to function.
Merrill, supra, at 1004 (footnotes omitted).
24. See Michael Asimow, The Adjudication Process, in ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICA-
TION BY STATE AGENCIES, 25 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 447, 541 (1995). Asimow
states, "[s]ome people have argued to me that agencies are not making any significant law or
policy through their adjudicatory decisions, simply finding facts. I doubt this. Every agency
is confronted by vague statutory terms, such as 'unprofessional conduct' or 'moral turpitude'
or 'gross negligence.' Their decisions make law." Id. at 539 n.306.
25. See Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REv. 1157, 1192 (1995). "An agency frequently has
occasion to interpret the meaning of statutes or other legal texts such as its own regulations,
judicial decisions, or the common law. It might engage in legal interpretation when carrying
out any of its functions: adjudicating cases, engaging in rulemaking, advising regulatees or
its own staff, or exercising discretion." Id.
26. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14 (Yale University
Press 1921). Judges and scholars have discredited the notion that adjudication operates as an
instrumentality for the mechanical application of "discovered" law. See, e.g., Newman v.
Emerson Radio Corp., 772 P.2d 1059, 1062-64 (Cal. 1989). This "myth" of discovered law,
as former Chief Justice Roger Traynor characterized it (Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Pro-
spective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 535
(1977)), has long been criticized as unrealistic and out of touch with practical judicial reali-
ties. See, e.g., Beryl Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L.
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Before the legislature enacted Section 11425.60, the question re-
mained unsettled in California whether adjudicatively created interpre-
tive law retained its authority beyond the formative case. Dicta con-
tained in pre-Section 11425.60, California Courts of Appeal, and
Supreme Court decisions express unquestioning approval of the princi-
ple announced in the United States Supreme Court's second decision in
SEC v. Chenery Corp.27 ("Chenery II"), that agencies have discretion to
use either rulemaking or adjudication to introduce new law. 28 On the
other hand, before the Legislature's adoption of Section 11425.60, the
California Office of Administrative Law ("OAL") 29 construed APA
rulemaking statutes to prohibit agencies from relying on previous adju-
dicative decisions as precedents absent express statutory authority. 30
REV. 1, 4-5 (1960). "No sophisticated legal scholar today would fail to agree that 'the fiction
of mere law-finding by courts is being relegated to the shelf of forgotten things by bothjudges and jurists,' and that the 'creative nature of much judicial activity has become a
commonplace .... " Newman, 772 P.2d at 1063. Regarding the creative aspect of judicial
lawmaking, Justice Frankfurter candidly acknowledged, "Construction, no doubt, is not a
mechanical process and even when most scrupulously pursued by judges may not wholly
escape some retrospective infusion so that the line between interpretation and substitution is
sometimes thin." Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting). See generally MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (Win. M. Gaunt &
Sons, Inc., photo reprint 1994) (1933).
[M]ost modem jurists are outgrowing the superstitious awe of the printed word
and its magic potency. The meaning of a statute consists in the system of social
consequences to which it leads or of the solutions to all the possible social ques-
tions that can arise under it. These solutions or systems of consequences cannot
be determined solely from the words used, but require a knowledge of the social
conditions to which the law is to be applied as well as of the circumstances which
led to its enactment. Legal rules relate to human life, and grammar or formal
logic alone will not enable us to deduce their juridical consequences.
Id. at 131; see also Charles Grove Hains, General Observations on the Effects of Personal,
Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REV. 96 (1922), in
PHILIP SHUCHMAN, COHEN AND COHEN'S READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSO-
PHY 250 (1951).
Some time, no doubt, more facts regarding the personal element in the admini-
stration of justice will be rendered available, and, perhaps, a better educated pub-
lic will be prepared to know the truth - namely, that the process of judicial deci-
sion is determined to a considerable extent by the judges' views of fair play,
public policy, and their general consensus as to what is right and just.
Id. at 254.
27. 332 U.S. 194 (1947). See also infra Part III for a detailed discussion of Chenery I.
28. Id. at 202-03.
29. The OAL, an executive branch agency, reviews all adopted regulations that are sub-
ject to the California APA for compliance with statutorily mandated standards. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 11340.1 (West 2001) (creating the OAL). See also Marsha N. Cohen, Regulatory
Reform: Assessing The California Plan, 1983 DUKE L.J. 231 (1983) (surveying APA rule-
making requirements and critiquing OAL's oversight role).
30. Before Section 11425.60 was enacted, a few state agencies had authority to desig-
No published judicial decision directly addressed OAL's argument.
Some agencies adopted OAL's position and purportedly rejected the le-
gal relevance of previous adjudicative decisions. Such a policy encour-
aged sub silentio reliance on a body of concealed case law. Adjudica-
tors could not cite previous decisions as authoritative, but nevertheless
drew upon them to lessen the burden of continually redetermining set-
tled issues of law. Thus, innovations and interpretations introduced in
adjudicative decisions influenced future outcomes, but provided a la-
mentably dim beacon to guide the course of agency law.
Further frustrating the case-to-case predictability and uniformity of
adjudicative decisionmaking, the public had no access to the prior deci-
sions of most agencies except through backdoor channels or Public Re-
cords Act requests. 31 The lack of public access to an agency's operative
case law imperiled the integrity of the adversarial process, placing at a
disadvantage everyone except agency personnel and the few who closely
observed the agency's activities. Government Code Section 11425.60
enables open, consistent, and predictable application of agency case law
by recognizing the legitimacy of adjudicatory lawmaking and by requir-
ing agencies to make their precedential legal and policy determinations
available to everyone.
32
This article examines the nature of administrative precedent and the
bounds of agency lawmaking discretion under Government Code Sec-
tion 11425.60. This article contends that Section 11425.60 authorizes
agencies to promulgate, through adjudicative decisions, standards that
have the binding force and effect of law. Until a precedent is expressly
reversed or modified, it constrains the scope of agency enforcement dis-
cretion and controls the resolution of the same issues in subsequent
cases.
The legislature intended the grant of adjudicatory lawmaking powers
by Section 11425.60 in part to advance a cardinal state policy proscrib-
ing bureaucratic "underground law." 33 Because Section 11425.60 pro-
nate precedent decisions under their respective organic statutes. The agencies included the
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 409 (West 2001)), the
State Personnel Board (CAL. Gov'T CODE § 1985.2 (repealed)), and the Fair Employment
and Housing Commission (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12935(h) (West 2000)).
31. The California Public Records Act (codified at CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 6250-6270
(West 2001)). Some agencies, including the Public Utilities Commission, Agricultural La-
bor Relations Board, and Public Employment Relations Board, published their adjudicative
decisions before the 1995 APA reforms were enacted.
32. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 11425.60(c) (West 2001).
33. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHENTICATION BY STATE AGENCIES, 25 CAL. L. REVISION
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hibits agencies from relying on a decision as precedent unless the deci-
sion has been designated as precedential and indexed, unjustified failure
to designate determinations of significant recurring legal issues as pre-
cedential will promote "underground" reliance on those determinations
by adjudicators. Moreover, because Section 11425.60 exempts the fail-
ure to designate precedents from judicial review, agencies that simply
ignore the statute may be held accountable only through less direct po-
litical controls. In that regard, Professor Asimow suggests that the force
of public criticism or censure by the Legislature would provide a suffi-
cient motive to impel agency action. 34
Before the 1995 APA reforms, most state adjudicatory proceedings
were conducted outside the purview of the APA.35 Chapter II discusses
the 1995 APA's solution to the problem of unguided adjudicatory power
that predominated under the former statutory scheme. Chapter I1 dis-
cusses the federal bench's long-standing acceptance of agency case-by-
case lawmaking and reviews published California judicial decisions ex-
pressing approval of the federal doctrine. Chapter IV explores the na-
ture of administrative precedent and discusses the relevance of "fair no-
tice" and "consistency" principles to precedent decisions. Chapter V
discusses structural and doctrinal limitations on agency discretion to
formulate new law and policy through adjudication.
II. THE 1945 APA AND THE NEED FOR REFORM
The California APA established formal trial-type procedures for state
agency adjudication on a foundation of essential due process safe-
guards. 36 The Act's most significant and enduring contribution to the
fairness and integrity of the adjudicative process was the creation of the
Office of Administrative Hearings, an office within the Department of
General Services staffed by a corps of independent state hearing offi-
cers.37 The 1945 APA represented a great achievement in advancing the
COMM'N REPORTS 55, 163 (1995).
34. See Michael Asimow, The Adjudication Process, in ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICA-
TION BY STATE AGENCIES, 25 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N 447, 541 (1995).
35. See COHEN, supra note 26, at 238-39.
36. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.10 (West 2001).
37. See generally Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independ-
ence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986) (discussing the
preeminent status of an independent adjudicator among due process values); see also Rich-
ard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias In Agency Decisionmaking, 57
U. CHI. L. REv. 481 (1990) (discussing the line between appropriate political control and
independent bias in agency decisionmakers). In 1985, the Legislature changed the civil ser-
21-2
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rule of law in administrative adjudication, but from the outset it had a
conspicuous shortcoming. The APA's procedures and safeguards ap-
plied only to enumerated agencies and only to the proceedings specified
by the agencies' constituent statutes.
38
The California Legislature adopted the 1945 APA principally to es-
tablish uniform procedures in adversarial evidentiary hearings conducted
by state licensing agencies. In the decades following the APA's adop-
tion, adjudicatory activities by non-APA agencies expanded dramati-
cally, without concomitant legislative resolve to structure those activi-
ties. By the 1990s, the APA covered only a small fraction of state
agency adjudicatory proceedings. 39
Non-APA adjudication under the former statutory regime operated
under an eclectic assortment of uncodified bureaucratic folkways, ena-
bling statutes, regulations, and a few, but important, reforms imposed by
the courts.40 Institutional inertia and incessant competing calls on
agency attention and resources prevented many non-APA agencies from
promulgating standards to govern adjudicatory hearing procedure. The
need for a statewide approach to administrative adjudication, emphasiz-
ing procedural uniformity and the participatory rights of the public, was
apparent and long overdue. The absence of explicit standards to curb
agency adjudicatory discretion subjects the public to the desultory im-
pulses of individual officials and the risk of thoroughgoing corruption.
4 1
vice title of Office of Administrative Hearings hearing officers to administrative law judge.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11502 (West 2001).
38. Former CAL. GoV'T CODE § 11501 (West 1992) (amended 2001). "[T]he Adminis-
trative Procedure Act itself is restricted in its application to implement only those functions
of a state agency to which it is expressly 'made applicable by the statutes relating to the par-
ticular agency,' [[CAL.] Gov'T CODE § 11501 (West 1992) (amended 2001)] and this restric-
tion has been strictly construed by the courts." See Serenko v. Bright, 70 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (Ct.
App. 1968) (quoting Bertch v. Soc. Welfare Dep't of Cal., 289 P.2d 485, 487 (Cal. 1955);
Taliaferro v. Ins. Comm'n of Cal., 298 P.2d 914, 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)).
39. Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudi-
cation Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1073 (1992) (stating that approximately
ninety-five percent of state agency adjudications fell outside the APA's purview).
40. See ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION BY STATE AGENCIES, 25 CAL. L. REVISION
COMM'N REPORTS 55, 79 (1995).
41. A recent report by a California State Senate committee emphasizes the need to cir-
cumscribe agency discretion by clear statutory standards and close-range legislative over-
sight. CAL. S. INS. COMM'N. THE DEP'T OF INS.: IN RUBBLE AFTER NORTHRIDGE (August 28,
2000), at http://www.sen.ca.gov/htbin/testbin/seninfodated?sen.commuittee.standing.insur-
ance.reports (last visited Jan. 27, 2002) (finding that former California Insurance Commis-
sioner Chuck Quackenbush grossly abused his discretionary powers by running the State
Insurance Department as a privately-held satrapy).
• ' 11 9tlfll
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The 1995 reform legislation redressed the legislature's delegation of
unchecked adjudicatory power to agencies cast adrift from the APA by
simply reversing the 1945 APA's coverage formula. Whereas the origi-
nal APA covered only agencies listed in the Act and applied only when
expressly required by the named agencies' enabling statutes, the revised
APA's administrative adjudication provisions mandate fundamental pro-
cedural safeguards by default. Under the revised California APA,
minimum due process guarantees and enumerated public interest protec-
tions apply "whenever the federal or state Constitution or a federal or
state statute" requires an adjudicatory hearing.42 The APA codifies
these foundational guarantees and protections in an Administrative Ad-
judication Bill of Rights.43 Unless a state or federal statute or federal
regulation provides otherwise, 44 the Bill of Rights mandates the follow-
ing basic protections in all agency adjudicatory proceedings covered by
the APA: the right to notice of the agency action; the right to obtain a
copy of the agency's governing procedure; the right to a neutral presid-
ing officer; the right to a public hearing; the right to present and rebut
evidence; the right to language assistance; the right to a written decision
based on the record; and a restriction on ex-parte communications. 45
The Administrative Adjudication Bill of Rights also prohibits agen-
cies from relying on a previous adjudicative decision as precedent unless
the agency has designated the decision as precedential and has made the
decision available to the public.46 This provision was designed in part to
safeguard litigants and the public against the inherent unfairness of an
agency's informally relying on interpretive conventions hidden in un-
published case law to support a decision or justify regulatory action.
42. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11410.10 (West 2001).
43. CAL. GOV'T CODE § § 11425.10-.60 (West 2001).
44. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11415.20, 11425.10(b) (West 2001).
45. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11425.10. The ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION BILL OF
RIGHTS applies also to adjudicatory hearings of non-governmental entities created by statute
to administer a state function (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11410.60 (West 2001) (defining such en-
tities as "quasi-public")) and to local agency hearings where required by statute (CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 11410.30 (West 2001)).
46. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11425. 10(a)(7), 11425.60 (West 2001).
III. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATORY
LAWMAKING
A. Chenery 147
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Chenery II firmly es-
tablished as a principle of administrative law that federal regulatory
agencies with rulemaking and adjudicatory powers have discretion to
choose either mode as the mechanism for making new law.48 The Court
decided Chenery II against the historical backdrop of the Court's post-
New Deal shift in attitude about the legitimacy of an omnicompetent
federal bureaucracy within the three-branch constitutional framework.
The case presented the question whether an agency with delegated rule-
making powers also had the power to develop and retroactively apply a
new statutory interpretation in an adjudicatory proceeding. 49 The Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") had conducted the proceeding
to determine whether to approve a registered holding company's volun-
tary reorganization plan under the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935.50 The company's plan included a proposal by company man-
agers to convert preferred shares they had purchased during the reor-
ganization period into common stock of the reorganized company. Nei-
ther the SEC's regulations nor the Public Utility Holding Company Act
addressed the issue of insider trading during reorganization. In the adju-
dicatory proceeding, the SEC found no evidence of fraud or lack of dis-
closure by the managers but concluded the stock purchase and proposed
conversion contravened broad public interest standards enumerated in
the Public Utility Holding Company Act.51 At a decision of first im-
pression, the SEC refused to approve the reorganization plan unless the
managers surrendered their preferred shares.
52
The corporation argued before the Supreme Court that the SEC lacked
authority to apply retroactively a new construction of the Public Utility
47. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
48. Id. at 202-03.
49. Id. at 196.
50. Id. at 197.
51. The Public Utility Holding Company Act authorized the SEC to approve a reor-
ganization plan if it found the plan "fair and equitable" and allowed the SEC to disapprove
the issuance of new securities that would be "detrimental to the public interest or the interest
of investors." Id. at 204 (quoting Section 7 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15
U.S.C. § 79g (2001)).
52. Id. at 197-98.
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Holding Company Act in the adjudicatory proceeding; if the SEC de-
sired to prohibit insider trading it would have to do so through prospec-
tive rulemaking.53 The Supreme Court rejected the company's argu-
ments and held the SEC's failure to adopt a controlling regulation did
not deprive it of authority to reject the proposed reorganization plan.54
The Court emphasized the point that the SEC, once confronted with the
unique circumstances presented in the adjudication, could not avoid its
statutory duty to apply the proper statutory standards, "regardless of
whether those standards previously had been spelled out in a general
rule or regulation." 55 The Court concluded the SEC had authority under
the Act's broad mandate to develop a new regulatory standard of con-
duct in the adjudicatory proceeding:
Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the
ability to make new law prospectively through the exer-
cise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely
upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of
conduct within the framework of the Holding Company
Act. The function of filling in the interstices of the Act
should be performed, as much as possible, through this
quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in
the future. But, any rigid requirement to that effect
would make the administrative process inflexible and in-
capable of dealing with many of the specialized prob-
lems that arise. . . . Not every principle essential to the
effective administration of a statute can or should be cast
immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some prin-
ciples must await their own development, while others
must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situa-
tions. In performing its important functions in these re-
spects, therefore, an administrative agency must be
equipped to act either by general rule or by individual
order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion
of the other is to exalt form over necessity.
In other words, problems may arise in a case which the
administrative agency could not reasonably foresee,
problems which must be solved despite the absence of a
relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had
sufficient experience with a particular problem to war-
53. Id. at 199-200.
54. Id. at 200.
55. Id. at 201.
21 2
rant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast
rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying
in nature as to be impossible to capture within the
boundaries of a general rule. In those situations, the
agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a
case-by-case basis if the administrative process is to be
effective. There is thus a very definite place for the
case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. And the
choice made between proceeding by general rule or by
individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in
the informed discretion of the administrative agency.56
The Court also rejected the company's argument that the SEC im-
properly applied the new regulatory principle retroactively:
That such action might have a retroactive effect was not
necessarily fatal to its validity. Every case of first im-
pression has a retroactive effect, whether the new princi-
ple is announced by a court or by an administrative
agency. But such retroactivity must be balanced against
the mischief of producing a result that is contrary to a
statutory design or to legal and equitable principles. If
that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroac-
tive application of a new standard, it is not the type of
retroactivity that is condemned by law.57
The decision drew a stinging dissent from Justice Jackson, who re-
buked the majority for approving "administrative authoritarianism" and
encouraging "conscious lawlessness as a permissible rule of administra-
tive action." 58 Jackson's critique warns that the majority's overreaching
deference to agency discretion weakens the judiciary's constitutional
role as a check against bureaucratic autocracy.59 Nevertheless, since
56. Id. at 202-03 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 203.
58. Id. at 217 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson filed his dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Frankfurter joined, more than three months after the majority opinion was filed. Id.
at 209. Although Jackson's words are severe, one can presume they were chosen carefully.
59. In a later case, Jackson described administrative bodies as "a veritable fourth
branch of government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories." FTC v. Ruber-
oid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Cf. ROSCOE POUND, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 65-66 (1942). ("It is true that there is no magic virtue in the number three.
But it is the separation or distribution of powers that is the significant feature of our constitu-
tional polity, and a concentration of them in a fourth [branch] is objectionable, not 'in the
light of numerology' but because it brings back the type of government that our constitutions
were set up to avoid.") But see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 245 (1995) (Breyer,
J., concurring.) ("[T]he unnecessary building of such walls is, in itself, dangerous, because
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Chenery II the Court has not retreated from the position that agencies
have broad discretion to choose rulemaking or adjudication as the vehi-
cle to make new law and policy.
60
The Chenery II doctrine retained its vitality after Congress enacted
the 1946 Federal Administrative Procedure Act,61 which did not play a
part in the Court's Chenery II decision.62 In a Federal APA-era case,
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace,63 the Supreme Court affirmed the continuing
vigor of Chenery II and rejected an argument that the Board violated the
Act's notice and comment rulemaking requirements when it announced
and retroactively applied a new regulatory principle in an adjudicatory
proceeding. The Supreme Court stated:
The views expressed in Chenery II and Wyman-Gordon
make plain that the Board is not precluded from an-
nouncing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding
and that the choice between rulemaking and adjudication
lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion.
Although there may be situations where the Board's reli-
ance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of dis-
cretion or a violation of the Act, nothing in the present
case would justify such a conclusion.... It is doubtful
whether any generalized standard could be framed which
would have more than marginal utility. The Board thus
has reason to proceed with caution, developing its stan-
dards in a case-by-case manner.... The Board's judg-
ment that adjudication best serves this purpose is entitled
to great weight.64
the Constitution blends, as well as separates, powers in its effort to create a government that
will work for, as well as protect the liberties of, its citizens.");
Not only does history show no example-of any form of government where the
three powers were really sharply separated, but modem political science has
learned a general distrust of the naive rationalism which supposes that the com-
plicated facts of government can be readily and sharply divided into airtight a
priori compartments.
MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 114 (Wm.
M. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., photo. reprint 1994 (1933)).
60. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998); Martin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1996).
62. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 220 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
63. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
64. Id. at 295.
Chenery I and Bell Aerospace define the current federal administra-
tive law doctrine.65 According to Professors Davis and Pierce, the U.S.
Supreme Court:
[H]as not even suggested that a court can constrain an
agency's choice between rulemaking and adjudication in
any opinion since Bell Aerospace. Nor has it suggested
any content that might be given its vague reference to
"abuse of discretion" as a potential basis for reversing an
agency's decision to rely on adjudication as a means of
announcing a "rule." 66
B. The Influence of Chenery 1167 in California
Most states follow the Chenery H principle and accord agencies broad
discretion to develop law and policy through adjudication, as well as
through rulemaking.68  The California Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeal had voiced unanimous approval of the Chenery II discretion
65. See, e.g, Am. Airlines v. Dep't of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 797 (5th Cir. 2000)
("Agencies have discretion to choose between adjudication and rulemaking as a means of
setting policy."); Bob Evans Farms v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he
functions of rulemaking and adjudication are not mutually exclusive; frequently adjudication
is the vehicle for a statutory interpretation that is functionally equivalent to a rule."); Shalala
v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96-97 (1995) ("The APA does not require that all
the specific applications of a rule evolve by further, more precise rules rather than by adjudi-
cation. The Secretary's mode of determining benefits by both rulemaking and adjudication
is, in our view, a proper exercise of her statutory mandate."); SBC Communications v. FCC,
138 F.3d 410, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Inherent in an agency's ability to choose adjudication
rather than rulemaking is the option to make policy choices in small steps, and only as a case
obliges it to.") (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947))); Jacks v. Crabtree, 114
F.3d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[Ilt is a well-established principle of administrative law that
an agency to whom Congress grants discretion may elect between rulemaking and ad hoc
adjudication to carry out its mandate.'".). Some federal agencies, including the National La-
bor Relations Board, have opted to use adjudication to develop most of their substantive
policies. See, e.g., Allentown, 522 U.S. at 374; Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v.
NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Despite substantial and repeated scholarly and
judicial criticism, the Board has largely ignored the rule making process, and has chosen
rather to fashion new standards and to abrogate old ones in the context of case-by-case adju-
dication."). See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULA-
TORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES 568 (4th ed. 1999).
66. 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 6.8, 273 (3d ed. 1994).
67. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
68. 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE §212[4] (2d ed. 1997).
See also Section 2-102(b) of the MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981,
which recognizes the validity of adjudicative precedent: "A written final order may not be
relied on as precedent by an agency to the detriment of any person until it has been made
available for public inspection and indexed .. "
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principle in a number of decisions issued before the California Legisla-
ture and expressly accredited administrative precedent decisions in
1995. A close reading of the decisions reveals, however, that their spe-
cific holdings did not rely on an affirmation of Chenery II.
In Associated California Loggers v. Kinder ("Loggers ,,),69 the Cali-
fornia Insurance Commissioner invoked the accusation and adjudication
process to enforce a new construction of a statute prohibiting unlawful
rebates on insurance business.70 Although Loggers I presented a proce-
dural issue, whether affected third parties had standing to challenge the
commissioner's action, the Court of Appeal accepted the Chenery II
doctrine that state agencies had discretionary power to develop new
policies through rulemaking or case-by-case adjudication. 71 The Log-
gers I court stated:
While it appears that Government Code [S]ection 11371
et seq., including [S]ection 11440, have reference to the
promulgation of policy through general rules and regula-
tions, it is clear that the commissioner can effectively
promulgate general policy by a series of accusations and
administrative adjudications directed at individual insur-
ers such as is the case at bench. In short, the commis-
sioner, by invalidating these service contracts, is prom-
ulgating a rule that in effect prohibits providers of
workers' compensation insurance from contracting to
have administrative services performed by the insured.72
Two years after Loggers I, the case came before the same court, this
time on the merits. In Loggers H, 73 the court reaffirmed the principle
that agencies have discretion to use rulemaking or case-by-case adjudi-
cation to make law:
As we observed in our previous opinion, the commis-
sioner was authorized by then Government Code
[S]ection 11371 to adopt regulations of general applica-
tion to the industry that he is authorized to regulate. We
further noted that he can, as a practical matter, effec-
tively promulgate policy by a series of administrative ad-
69. 144 Cal. Rptr. 786 (Ct. App. 1978).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 791-92.
72. Id.
73. Associated Cal. Loggers v. Kinder, 168 Cal. Rptr. 67 (Ct. App. 1980).
judications .... 74
The court found, however, that the administrative record did not sup-
port the grounds relied on by the commissioner as justification for the
order and affirmed the trial court's judgment declaring the commis-
sioner's order invalid.75
In ALRB v. California Coastal Farms, Inc.7 6 the California Supreme
Court described as a "well-settled principle of administrative law" the
Chenery II Court's statement that "in discharging its delegated responsi-
bilities the choice between proceeding by general rule or by ad hoc ad-
judication "lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency."' 77  The Court's Coastal Farms decision did not turn on the
question of agency power to develop new law through adjudication, but
rather focused on the issue of the trial court's power to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction granting labor union representatives access to non-
striking farm workers. Although the holding in Coastal Farms did not
reach the question of agency power, the California Supreme Court ex-
pressed unequivocal acceptance of the Chenery II discretion principle as
settled law in California.
78
In F&P Growers Ass 'n v. ALRB, 79 the Court of Appeal cited the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's Coastal Farms dicta and affirmed a Board adju-
dicatory decision that applied a new interpretation of the unfair labor
practices statutes. The appellate court stated, "[w]e see no reason to de-
part from the general rule that the choice between proceeding by general
rule or adjudication lies primarily in the informed discretion of the ad-
ministrative agency ... ."80
74. Id. at 69-70.
75. Id.
76. 645 P.2d 739 (Cal. 1983).
77. Id. at 235-36; Accord Mein v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm'n,
267 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255-56 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Coastal Farms, 645 P.2d at 743-44, as
authority for the "well-settled principle of administrative law that agency has discretionary
choice between proceeding by rulemaking or adjudication").
78. Accord ALRB v. Superior Court, 546 P.2d 687, 700-01 (Cal. 1976).
79. 218 Cal. Rptr. 736 (Ct. App. 1985).
80. Id. at 742; Accord 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 878 P.2d 566, 606 (Cal.
1994), affirming the Insurance Commissioner's broad implied powers under the agency's
statutory rate regulation authority to "establish rules to resolve various interstitial legal, pol-
icy, and technical issues." The Court also noted, "[a]n administrative official may frame
rules deliberately in quasi-legislative proceedings to adopt regulations. Or [the official] may
develop rules ad hoc in the course of quasi-adjudicatory review." Id. (alterations in origi-
nal). See also Goleta Valley Cmty. Hosp. v. Dep't of Health Servs., 197 Cal. Rptr. 294, 297
(Ct. App. 1983) (dicta) ("Like courts, agencies may overrule prior decision or practices and
may initiate new policy or law through adjudication .... ) (alterations in original).
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Despite apparent unanimous acceptance of the Chenery H discretion
principle by California's higher courts, the respected California Office
of Administrative Law ("OAL") maintained (in its pre-July 1, 1997 de-
terminations) that agencies did not have the power to use adjudication as
an agent to promulgate new law or create binding interpretations absent
an express statutory exemption from APA rulemaking requirements.
81
The OAL supported that argument by relying on the APA's broad defi-
nition of "regulation"8 2 and the APA mandate that "no state agency shall
issue, utilize, enforce, or attempt to enforce any... order, standard of
general application, or other rule, which is a regulation as defined in [the
APA] ... unless [it] ... has been adopted as a regulation... ."83 The
California Law Revision Commission comments to Section 11425.60
suggest the Legislature had OAL's contentions in mind when it declared
in Section 11425.60(b) that "designation of a decision or part of a deci-
sion as a precedent decision is not rulemaking and need not be done un-
der [APA rulemaking procedures]....
81. See, e.g., 1993 OAL DETERMINATION No. 1; 1999 OAL DETERMINATION No. 9, 30
n. 40 ("OAL's position since 1986 has been that, absent an express statutory exemption from
the APA, agency precedent decision systems violate the APA."). The Legislature authorized
OAL to issue "determinations" on the issue whether any agency guideline, standard, or pur-
ported rule constitutes a regulation subject to APA rulemaking requirements. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 11340.5(b) (West 2001). The APA mandates OAL to file its determinations with the
Secretary of State (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1 1340.5(c)(1) (West Supp. 2001)), and make its de-
terminations known to the agency, the Governor, and the Legislature (CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 11340.5(c)(2) (West Supp. 2001)), publish its determinations in the California Regulatory
Notice Register (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1 1340.5(c)(3) (West Supp. 2001)), and make its deter-
minations available to the public and the courts (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11340.5(c)(4) (West
Supp. 2001)). OAL's determinations are subject to judicial review and any interested person
may petition the court to set aside or modify a determination. (CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 11340.5(d) (West Supp. 2001)) In Frankel v. Kizer, the Court of Appeals stated, "[O]AL
determinations are only entitled to due consideration. The ultimate resolution of such legal
questions ... rests with the courts." Frankel v. Kizer, 21 Cal. App. 4th 743, 751-52 (Ct.
App. 1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Grier v. Kizer, 219 Cal. App. 3d 422, 432 (Ct.
App. 1990)). As previously noted, no California published court decision expressly ad-
dressed OAL's determinations regarding agency precedent decision systems.
82. The APA defines "regulation" as "[e]very rule, regulation, order, or standard of
general application or the amendment, supplement, or revision of any rule, regulation, order,
or standard adopted by any state agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the law
enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure..." See 5 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West
2000). See also infra note 9 and accompanying text.
83. CAL. GOV'T CODE §11340.5(a) (Deering 1997) (derived from former CAL GOV'T.
CODE § 11347.5 (West 2002)).
84. The Commission comments to the statute note OAL's argument rejecting the valid-
ity of agency precedent decisions and cite 1993 OAL DETERMINATION NO. 1. (CAL. L. RE-
VISION COMM'N, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.60 (West Supp. 2001)).
IV. THE NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRECEDENT
Government Code Section 11425.60 details substantive and proce-
dural requirements for agency precedent decisions, but does not expound
upon the nature of agency adjudicative precedent. Furthermore, it does
not explicitly define the extent to which precedent decisions legally bind
nonparties and the agency. 85 As discussed in Part A below, the lan-
guage of Section 11425.60 and the Law Revision Commission com-
ments to Sections 11425.60 and 11425.50(e) evince the statutory intent
to grant agencies the power to establish legally binding interpretations
and regulatory standards through precedent decisions. 86 Part B dis-
cusses "fair notice" requirements applicable to adjudicative precedents
that purport to declare binding standards. Part C discusses the adminis-
trative law principle requiring consistency in adjudicatory decisionmak-
ing.
A. The Binding Effects of Precedent Decisions
In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals
Board,87 the California Supreme Court characterized the Board's prece-
dent benefit decisions as "akin to agency rulemaking, because they an-
nounce how governing law will be applied in future cases." 88 The Court
85. Section 11425.60 does not define "precedent" but the term has a well-established
meaning in the jurisprudence of the courts: "[A] judicial decision... that serves as a rule for
future determinations in similar or analogous cases: an authority to be followed in courts of
justice." WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1783 (3d ed. 1986). Cf. E.A. Stephens & Co. v.
Albers, 256 P. 15, 16 (Colo. 1927):
So far as we have been able to determine the diligence of counsel has spread be-
fore us all "the law and the Gospels' touching the question at issue. Four chapters
of the Bible, department bulletin No. 1151 of the United States Department of
Agriculture, Belden on Fur Farming for Profit, Harding on Fox Raising, Darwin's
Origin of Species, Shakespeare's Henry IV, St. John Lucas, Suetonius, Aesop's
Fables, the Tale of the Spartan Youth, the Harvard Law Review, the Albany Law
Journal, the Central Law Journal, the London Law Times, the Criminal Law
Magazine, and certain anonymous writers, not to mention numerous statutes and
court decisions, adorn and illuminate their briefs. Leaving with reluctance all
these landmarks save the last two mentioned, we turn to the question here at is-
sue ......
86. CAL. GOV'TCODE § 11425(e) (West 2001).
87. Pac. Legal Found. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 624 P.2d 244, 247-48 (Cal.
1991) (involving a Board precedent benefit decision). The Legislature granted precedent
decision authority to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board in a 1967 amendment to
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 409 (West Supp. 2001).
88. Id. at 247. See also Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 213 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating that "[p]recedent decisions are akin to agency
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quoted from a letter to the Governor, written by the author of legislation
granting affected nonparties standing to seek judicial review of the
Board's precedents: "[f]or all practical purposes, precedent benefit deci-
sions are regulations and should be treated accordingly." 89
Administrative regulations embody rules and standards of general ap-
plication that have the same binding force and effect as legislative en-
actments. 90 California Government Code Section 11425.60 authorizes
agencies to designate as precedential a decision or part of a decision that
contains a "significant legal or policy determination of general applica-
tion that is likely to recur." 91 This language and the provision of Section
11425.60 exempting precedents from APA rulemaking requirements re-
veal the legislature's objective to confide in agencies substantive law-
making power under the precedent decision statute.
The Law Revision Commission's comments regarding APA Sections
11425.60 and 11425.50 lend support to this construction. 92 The Com-
mission's comment regarding Section 11425.60 states that the statute
"recognizes the need of agencies to be able to make law and policy
through adjudication as well as through rulemaking" and seeks "to en-
courage agencies to articulate what they are doing when they make new
law or policy in an adjudicative decision." 93
Section 11425.50(e) declares, "[a] penalty may not be based on a
guideline, criterion, bulletin, manual, instruction, order, standard of gen-
eral application, or other rule subject to [APA] Chapter 3.5 ... unless it
has been adopted as a regulation pursuant to Chapter 3.5 .... -94 The
Law Revision Commission comment regarding Section 11425.50 states,
"[a] penalty based on a precedent decision does not violate subdivision
rulemaking and, therefore, judicial recourse is available under [S]ection 409.2 to persons
affected by the precedent similar to recourse generally available against regulations.").
89. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The quoted letter pertained to the legislation en-
acting CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 409.2 (West Supp. 2001). That statute provides, "[A]ny
interested person or organization may bring an action for declaratory relief in the superior
court in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to obtain a judicial
declaration as to the validity of any precedent decision of the appeals board .... " CAL. UN-
EMP. INS. CODE § 409.2 (West Supp. 2001).
90. See ALRB v. Superior Court, 546 P.2d 687, 693 (Cal. 1976) ("[A] regulation
adopted by a state administrative agency pursuant to a delegation of rulemaking authority by
the Legislature has the force and effect of a statute."). Accord Simi Valley Adventist Hosp.
v. Bonta, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 633 (Ct. App. 2000).
91. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11425.60(b) (West Supp. 2001).
92. The California courts regard Law Revision Commission comments as a reliable
guide to legislative intent. See, e.g., Estate of Propst, 788 P.2d 628, 635 (Cal. 1990).
93. CAL. GOV'TCODE§ 11425.60 cmt. 142 (West Supp. 2001).
94. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.50(e) (West Supp. 2001).
(e).- 95 This statement, of course, presupposes that agencies have the
power under Section 11425.60 to promulgate enforceable standards of
conduct through precedent decisions.
96
B. Fair Notice
Under established due process doctrine, enactments that prescribe
standards of conduct must express those standards with sufficient clarity
and precision to provide fair notice to affected persons of the boundary
between lawful and prohibited conduct.97  In People v. Superior
95. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.50 cmt. 140 (West Supp. 2001). See also 9 WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE (1999) Administrative Proceedings, section 57 (b) ("A penalty may
properly be based on a precedent decision, since it is not an 'underground rule."').
96. The federal courts recognize agency power to create binding law through adjudica-
tion. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (stating that "An administrative agency has available two methods for formulating
policy that will have the force of law. An agency may establish binding policy through
rulemaking procedures by which it promulgates substantive rules, or through adjudications
which constitute binding precedents."). But see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759
(1969) (Fortas, J., plurality opinion). In a plurality opinion, the Court stated:
Adjudicated cases may and do, of course, serve as vehicles for the formulation of
agency policies, which are applied and announced therein. They generally pro-
vide a guide to action that the agency may be expected to take in future cases.
Subject to the qualified role of stare decisis in the administrative process, they
may serve as precedents. But this is far from saying, as the Solicitor General
suggests, that commands, decisions, or policies announced in adjudication are
"rules" in the sense that they must, without more, be obeyed by the affected pub-
lic.
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969) (Fortas, J., plurality opinion) (cita-
tion omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court decided Wyman-Gordon five years before NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). The Bell Aerospace decision
follows Chenery H and quotes from the Wyman-Gordon plurality opinion, omitting, how-
ever, Justice Fortas's dicta that regulatory standards developed through adjudication do not
have the force of law. Id. at 293-94. See also Ronald A. Cass, Models of Administrative
Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363 (1986). Cass points out the following:
The [Wyman-Gordon Court] plainly desired to segregate two processes, one leg-
islative in nature, the other judicial. Despite the obvious appeal of the bipolar
model, however, the justices could not adhere to it consistently. In Wyman-
Gordon, the Court upheld the application of the improperly adopted 'rule' be-
cause a procedurally proper adjudicative order applied the rule's mandate to the
Wyman-Gordon Company. In Bell Aerospace the Court effectively abandoned
its effort to keep the two processes distinct and adopted an opinion that clearly re-
sembled the Chenery decision. Rather than focus on the language of the APA,
the Court stressed the desirability of making some policy judgments through the
adjudicatory process, despite the general advantages of rulemaking for that task.
Cass, supra, at 383-84. See generally Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd.
of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973) (providing an overview of the importance and settled
policy of precedent in administrative proceedings).
97. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) ("'It is established that a law
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Court,98 the California Supreme Court stated: "[w]e insist that laws give
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited. . . -99 Due process also requires enactments to pro-
vide explicit guidelines to prevent "arbitrary and discriminatory" en-
forcement of the law. 100 As the court stated, "[a] vague law impermissi-
bly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers
of arbitrary and discriminatory application."''1 1
In Cranston v. City Of Richmond,10 2 the California Supreme Court
applied the fair notice test to quasi-legislative enactments: "'the prohibi-
tion against vagueness extends to administrative regulations affecting
conditions of governmental employment as well as to penal stat-
utes .... "'103 The Supreme Court has stated, however, that the Consti-
tution tolerates a lesser degree of specificity in an administrative pre-
script than required of a penal statute:
[W]hen an administrative regulation is challenged the
standard of constitutional vagueness is less strict than
when a criminal law is attacked. "In the field of regula-
tory statutes governing business activities, where the acts
limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is al-
lowed." "The standards of certainty in statutes punish-
ing for offenses is higher than in those depending pri-
marily upon civil sanction for enforcement."' 0 4
fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless
that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits."') (quoting Giaccio v. Penn-
sylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03); see also Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 387
(Cal. 1969) (stating that "[c]ivil as well as criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear as to
give a fair warning of the conduct prohibited, and they must provide a standard or guide
against which conduct can be uniformly judged by courts and administrative agencies.").
The due process interests in fair notice are protected by the United States Constitution and
the California Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
98. 758 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1988).
99. Id. at 1049.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 710 P.2d 845 (1985).
103. Id. at 850 (quoting Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir. 1974)). Accord
Diamond Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 528 F.2d
645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that: "If a violation of a regulation subjects private parties
to criminal or civil sanctions, a regulation cannot be construed to mean what an agency in-
tended but did not adequately express."). But see In re Perry, 882 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1989).
104. Ford Dealers Ass'n v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 650 P.2d 328, 339 (Cal. 1982)
(citations omitted). See also B. C. Cotton, Inc. v. Voss, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 484, 500 (Ct. App.
1995) (finding that: "[I]mprecision in a regulatory measure may in appropriate cases be
Fall 2001
According to the California courts, administrative civil sanctions do
not involve punishment, even though such sanctions may carry the
"sting of punishment." 10 5
"Administrative proceedings are civil in nature. With
particular reference to a proceeding to revoke or suspend
a license or other administrative action of a disciplinary
nature, it has been held in this state that such proceeding
is not a criminal or quasi-criminal prosecution. The pur-
pose of such a proceeding is not to punish but to afford
protection to the public.., by eliminating from the ranks
of practitioners those who are dishonest, immoral, dis-
reputable, or incompetent."'
10 6
Prospective lawmaking by adjudication invokes the same vagueness
concerns that bear upon legislative enactments. Thus, the California
courts should apply to precedent decisions the constitutional touchstone
that determines whether agency regulations meet fair notice require-
ments. The fair notice doctrine has been fully integrated into federal
administrative law:
Due process requires that parties receive fair notice be-
fore being deprived of property. The due process clause
thus "prevents ... deference from validating the applica-
tion of a regulation that fails to give fair warning of the
conduct it prohibits or requires." In the absence of no-
tice - for example, where the regulation is not suffi-
ciently clear to warn a party about what is expected of it
- an agency may not deprive a party of property by im-
posing civil or criminal liability. Of course, it is in the
context of criminal liability that this "no punishment
without notice" rule is most commonly applied. But as
long ago as 1968, we recognized this " "fair notice .... re-
quirement in the civil administrative context ....
[E]lementary fairness compels clarity in the statements
and regulations setting forth the actions with which the
agency expects the public to comply. This requirement
has now been thoroughly incorporated into administra-
tive law. 107
cured by construction and application.").
105. People v. Damon, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 519 & n.20 (Ct. App. 1996).
106. Id. at 519 (quoting Borror v. Dep't of Investment, 15 Cal. App. 3d 531, 540 (Ct.
App. 1971) (citations omitted).
107. Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citations omit-
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C. CONSISTENCY
A fundamental corollary of adjudicatory lawmaking power constrains
agencies to follow their precedents consistently or adequately explain
the reasons for not doing so.10 8 The consistency principle, which Justice
Breyer refers to as a "procedural principle" of administrative law, 10 9 re-
sembles the judicial stare decisis doctrine, but appropriately permits
agencies substantial discretion to make reasoned changes from previous
policies. 1 0 The United States Supreme Court has stated, "[W]e fully
recognize that [regulatory] agencies do not establish rules of conduct to
last forever, and that an agency must be given ample latitude to adapt
their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances." 11
In Weiss v. State Board of Equalization 2 , the California Supreme
Court, influenced by the post-New Deal administrative jurisprudence of
the federal bench, endorsed the principle that agencies have discretion to
ted). Accord Satellite Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Satellite
Broad. Co., the court stated that:
Traditional concepts of due process incorporated into administrative law preclude
an agency from penalizing a private party for violating a rule without first provid-
ing adequate notice of the substance of the rule .... The Commission through
its regulatory power cannot, in effect, punish a member of the regulated class for
reasonably interpreting Commission rules. Otherwise the practice of administra-
tive law would come to resemble "Russian Roulette." The agency's interpreta-
tion is entitled to deference, but if it wishes to use that interpretation to cut off a
party's right, it must give full notice of its interpretation.
Id. See generally Timothy A. Wilkins, Regulatory Confusion, Ignorance of Law, and Defer-
ence to Agencies, 49 SMU L. REv. 1561 (1996). (Professor Wilkins's article analyzes the
significance of General Electric, and discusses the "regulatory confusion" defense in light of
the due process standards articulated by the court. According to Wilkins, regulatory confu-
sion results when persons subject to a regulation cannot reasonably ascertain the meaning of
the regulation or the agency's interpretation of the regulation.).
108. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Discretionary Decisionmaking In The Regulatory
Agencies: A Conceptual Framework, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 101 (1983) (examining discretion-
ary decision making by regulatory agencies); L. Harold Levinson, The Legitimate Expecta-
tion that Public Officials Will Act Consistently, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 549 (1998) (exploring
the "consistency principle" in American law and how government agencies deal with con-
flicting laws).
109. STEPHEN G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 452
(4th ed. 1999).
110. See generally cases collected in Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation Comment Note,
Applicability of Stare Decisis Doctrine to Decisions of Administrative Agencies, 79 A.L.R.
2d 1126 (1999) (discussing the rule of stare decisis and precedent in administrative adjudica-
tion). See also Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules
and Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1187 (1997) (discussing the role of judicial review).
111. Motor Vehicle Mfgs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (citations omitted).
112. 256 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1953).
disregard policies announced in earlier decisions so long as the agency's
action is not arbitrary or unreasonable. 113 The Court stated, "'[D]ue
process... probably ... permits substantial deviation from the principle
of stare decisis. Like courts, agencies may overrule prior decisions or
practices and may initiate new policy or law through adjudication."' 11
4
In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita Board of
Trade,115 the Supreme Court explained the principle forbidding unex-
plained departures from precedent as an aspect of fidelity to the
agency's statutory mandate:
A settled course of behavior embodies the agency's in-
formed judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will
carry out the policies committed to it by Congress.
There is, then, at least a presumption that those policies
will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.
From this presumption flows the agency's duty to ex-
plain its departure from prior norms. The agency may
flatly repudiate those norms, deciding, for example, that
changed circumstances mean that they are no longer re-
quired in order to effectuate congressional policy. Or it
may narrow the zone in which some rule will be applied,
because it appears that a more discriminating invocation
of the rule will best serve congressional policy. Or it
may find that, although the rule in general serves useful
purposes, peculiarities of the case before it suggest that
the rule not be applied in that case. Whatever the ground
for the departure from prior norms, however, it must be
clearly set forth so that the reviewing court may under-
stand the basis of the agency's action and so may judge
the consistency of that action with the agency's man-
113. Id. at 3.
114. Id. (quoting 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 168 (3d ed.1994)). See also, Citicorp N. Am., Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d
509, 522-23 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Adherence to an outmoded rule for the sake of consistency in
the face of compelling reasons to change is not a virtue .. "). See also Californians for Po-
litical Reform Found. v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 606, 616 (Ct.
App. 1998) ("In the general case, of course, an administrative agency may change its inter-
pretation of a statute, rejecting an old construction and adopting a new. Put simply, [a]n ad-
ministrative agency is not disqualified from changing its mind .. "). "As long as the
change is constitutionally and legislatively permissible, an agency would be remiss in not
adapting its interpretation of the rules to fit the practicalities and present economic condi-
tions dictating a change." Citicorp N. Am., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522.
115. 412 U.S. 800 (1973).
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date. 116
The federal courts uniformly follow the principle articulated in Atchi-
son. 117 For example, in Greyhound Corp. v. ICC,118 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
This court emphatically requires that administrative
agencies adhere to their own precedents or explain any
deviations from them. Of course, the agency is free to
make reasoned changes in its policies. However, as this
court noted in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC, there is an "equally essential proposition that,
when an agency decides to reverse its course, it must
provide an opinion or analysis indicating that the stan-
dard is being changed and not ignored, and assuring that
it is faithful and not indifferent to the rule of law. 119
The court found that the Commission's order against Greyhound Cor-
poration deviated from the results the Commission had decreed in prior
similar cases as well as from the standards the Commission applied to
reach those results.120 Further, the court noted the order failed to make
even "passing reference" to the Commission's previous decisions. 121
116. Id. at 807-08. Many federal court decisions invoke APA judicial review standards
as a substantive prohibition against unexplained departures from precedent. (Section
706(2)(A) of the federal APA mandates a reviewing court to set aside agency action found to
be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law .. "). See, e.g., INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996). In Yueh-Shaio Yang
the Supreme Court stated:
Though the agency's discretion is unfettered at the outset, if it announces and fol-
lows - by rule or by settled course of adjudication - a general policy by which
its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy
(as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be
overturned as "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion" within the mean-
ing of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
Id.
An agency action that constitutes an unexplained departure from precedent must
be reversed as arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of §706 of the APA.
This doctrine makes it far more difficult for any agency to make adjudicatory de-
cisions based on undisclosed, impermissible motives .... If an agency treats in-
dividuals differently, it must acknowledge and explain that difference in treat-
ment.
3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.5 (3d
ed. 1994).
117. 412 U.S. 800 (1973).
118. 551 F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
119. Id. at 416 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at417.
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The court stated, "[T]he Commission's utter failure to come to grips
with this problem constitutes an inexcusable departure from the essential
requirement of reasoned decision making."' 122 The court remanded the
case to the Commission for reconsideration, giving the Commission
these closing words of guidance:
We do not remand for the Commission merely to reiter-
ate its decision with some new words of justification
added. Our decision requires that the Commission af-
firmatively and in good faith reconsider Greyhound's
case. If after such reconsideration the Commission still
deems it necessary to depart from its established prece-
dents, then the agency may do so provided that it ade-
quately supports its reasons. Even then, the ICC must
"do more than enumerate factual differences, if any, be-
tween [this case] and the other cases; it must explain the
relevance of those differences to the purposes of [the
enabling statute]." 123
In Silva v. Nelson, 124 a case involving the meaning of employee "mis-
conduct" under the unemployment insurance statutes, the California
Court of Appeal reversed a trial court judgment sustaining an Unem-
ployment Insurance Appeals Board decision that conflicted with one of
the Board's earlier precedent benefit decisions. 125 In the adjudicatory
proceeding, the Board found the applicant lost his job because of a sin-
122. Id. at 417-18 (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
123. Id. at 418 (quoting Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 730, 733 (D.C. Cir.
1965)). See, e.g., Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 69 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
[T]he agency appeared to "gloss over or swerve from prior precedents without
discussion," thereby foregoing reasoned decision making. It may well be that the
Commission had in mind this, or another, rational explanation for its ruling. But
as we have noted in the past, "without any explicit recognition by the Commis-
sion that the standard has been changed, or any attempt to forthrightly distinguish
or outrightly reject apparently inconsistent precedent, we are left with no guide-
posts for determining the consistency of administrative action in similar cases, or
for accurately predicting future action by the Commission...." If the agency's de-
cision adequately explains the reasons for its departure from precedent, the courts
defer to the agency's new policy. "An agency is obligated to follow precedent,
and if it chooses to change, it must explain why. Once an agency justifies its
change with sufficient, reasoned analysis, however, the revised policy deserves
the same deference as the original policy."
British Steel PLC v. United States, 127 F.3d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
124. 106 Cal. Rptr. 908 (Ct. App. 1973).
125. Id. at 909.
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gle vulgar outburst at work. 126 The Board decided the employee's out-
burst constituted "misconduct" within the meaning of the statute, and
that the employee was therefore ineligible for unemployment bene-
fits. 127 The Court of Appeal held that neither the Board's findings nor
the Board's earlier construction of "misconduct" supported the Board
decision 128 and directed the trial court to issue a writ of mandate, 129 re-
quiring the Board to set aside its decision and reinstate appellant's bene-
fits.
As previously noted, the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board's
statutory precedent decision authority predated the APA precedent deci-
sion statute. 130 The authorizing statute, Unemployment Insurance Code
Section 409,131 declares the Board's precedents shall be dispositive of
similar cases: "The director and the appeals board of administrative law
judges shall be controlled by those precedents except as modified by ju-
dicial review." 132  The APA precedent decision statute contains no
analogous provision, indicating the Legislature's intent to give agencies
discretion to implement Section 11425.60 according to their specific
needs and structural arrangements. 133 Although Section 11425.60 does
not explicitly require agencies or adjudicators to follow precedent, the
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 911. The Board's earlier precedent benefit decision construed the term
"misconduct" to denote "wantonness, culpability or willfulness with wrongful intent or evil
design" and that "mere mistakes, errors in judgment... and similar minor peccadilloes" did
not rise to that level. Id. at 910-11 (quoting Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 296 N.W. 636,
640 (Wis. 1941)).
129. The California administrative mandate statute empowers the courts to invalidate
an agency adjudicatory decision where the agency's action constitutes a prejudicial abuse of
discretion. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (Deering 1996). An abuse of discretion is estab-
lished under the statute if the agency "has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the
order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the
evidence." Id.
130. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
131. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 22 § 5109 (1992).
132. The Board retains the authority to overrule, modify, or refine a previous precedent
decision. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 22, § 5109(b) (1992).
133. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11425.60 (Deering 1997). Compare, for example, Unem-
ployment Insurance Code Section 409 with the California Medical Board's regulation im-
plementing Government Code Section 11425.60(a): "Once the [Division of Medical Quality]
designates a decision or part of a decision as precedent, the division may rely on it or that
part of it as precedent .... CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 16, § 1364.40, subd. (b) (1992). The
Board's regulation, despite its directory language, does not invest the agency with discretion
to ignore controlling precedents; rather, it recognizes the agency's inherent power to deviate
from precedent to correct previous mistakes, create exceptions, and change policies to ac-
commodate unforeseen and changing conditions.
well-established consistency principle applied by the federal courts and
implicitly followed by the Court of Appeal in Silva 134 provides a sound
model for California agencies and reviewing courts.
California administrative common law and statutory judicial review
standards provide ample authority for the courts to invalidate unex-
plained deviations from agency adjudicative precedent. Both California
and federal law require agencies to identify the legal standards applied
in resolving adjudicated disputes and to articulate the evidentiary nexus
between the legal standards and the agency's conclusion. 135 In Topanga
Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles,13 6 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that agency adjudicative decisions must contain
"findings sufficient both to enable the parties to determine whether and
on what basis they should seek review and, in the event of review, to ap-
prise a reviewing court of the basis for the board's action."' 137
Consistent with Topanga's mandate, the APA Administrative Adjudi-
cation Bill of Rights declares adjudicative decisions "shall be in writing
and shall include a statement of the factual and legal basis for the deci-
sion." 138 The Law Revision Commission comment to that Bill of Rights
provision emphasizes the importance of the provision's requirements to
precedent decisions:
The requirement that the decision must include a state-
ment of the basis for the decision is particularly signifi-
cant when an agency develops new policy through the
adjudication of specific cases rather than through rule-
making. Articulation of the basis for the agency's deci-
sion facilitates administrative and judicial review, helps
clarify the effect of any precedential decision.., and fo-
cuses attention on questions that the agency should ad-
134. Silva v. Nelson, 106 Cal. Rptr. 908 (Ct. App. 1973).
135. See Fla. Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 876 F.2d 42, 45 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that the agency violated the regulated company's constitutional rights by failing to provide a
reasoned explanation why agency's rule applied to the specific facts of the case).
Due process. .. guarantees that parties who will be affected by the general rule
be given an opportunity to challenge the agency's action. When the rule is estab-
lished through formal rulemaking, public notice and hearing provide the neces-
sary protection. But where, as here, the rule is established in individual adjudica-
tions, due process requires that affected parties be allowed to challenge the basis
of the rule. FERC must be able to substantiate the general rule.
Id. at 44.
136. 522 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1974).
137. Id. at 16.
138. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.50(a) (Deering 1997).
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dress in subsequent rulemaking to supersede the policy
that has been developed through adjudicative proceed-
ings. 13
9
V. DOCTRINAL LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF ADJUDICATORY
LAWMAKING
A. Structural Constraints
Administrative agencies have only the powers expressly or implicitly
granted by their enabling statutes or the Constitution. 140 Any adminis-
trative action that exceeds the powers granted by the agency's organic
law or conflicts with a legislative enactment is void. 141 Thus, the APA
declares: "Each regulation adopted, to be effective, shall be within the
scope of authority conferred and in accordance with standards pre-
scribed by other provisions of law."142 The APA also declares that a
regulation adopted to implement a statute must be "consistent and not in
conflict with the statute and reasonably necessary to effectuate the pur-
139. Id. (West Supp. 2002) (Law Revision Commission Comments, 1995 Addition).
140. AFL v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 920 P.2d 1314, 1329 (Cal. 1996) (cita-
tion omitted). The courts liberally construe the permissible scope of agency powers to im-
plement their organic laws: "[Agency] powers are not limited to those expressly conferred
by statute; rather, [i]t is well settled in this state that [administrative] officials may exercise
such additional powers as are necessary for the due and efficient administration of powers
expressly granted by statute, or as may fairly be implied from the statute granting the pow-
ers." 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 878 P.2d 566, 583 (Cal. 1994) (emphasis in the
original). Although the implied powers doctrine gives agencies broad discretion to choose
the means of implementing their regulatory goals, the courts have refused to find implied
authority for an agency to impose restitutive monetary remedies different in kind from those
expressly authorized by statute. See also Dyna-Med, Inc. v. FEHC, 743 P.2d 1323 (Cal.
1987) (Commission's claim of implied authority to award punitive damages in an adminis-
trative proceeding for job discrimination rejected by the court.); Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d
728 (Cal. 1987) (California Horseracing Board's enabling statutes did not authorize the
Board to award compensatory or punitive damages.); Peralta Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. FEHC, 801
P.2d 357 (Cal. 1990) (Commission lacked implied authority to award general compensatory
damages for emotional distress in an administrative proceeding for sexual harassment.);
Walnut Creek Manor v. FEHC, 814 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1991) (Commission had no implied
power to award damages for emotional distress.); AFL v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.,
902 P.2d 1314 (Cal. 1996) (Board lacked implied authority to award prejudgment interest on
retroactive unemployment benefits.). In each case, the courts held the agency decision ex-
ceeded the statutory powers of the agency.
141. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Dep't of Developmental Servs., 696 P.2d 150, 153-
54 (Cal. 1985).
142. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11342.1 (Deering 1997).
pose of the statute." 143 These fundamental constraints on rulemaking
power apply with equal validity to adjudicative decisionmaking and, in-
deed, circumscribe all administrative agency power. In Agnew v. State
Board of Equalization,144 the California Supreme Court stated that both
administrative common law principles and the provisions of the APA
impose limitations on the scope of agency rulemaking authority:
Even apart from these statutory limits, it is well estab-
lished that the rulemaking power of an administrative
agency does not permit the agency to exceed the scope
of authority conferred on the agency by the Legislature.
"A ministerial officer may not. .. under the guise of a
rule or regulation vary or enlarge the terms of a legisla-
tive enactment or compel that to be done which lies
without the scope of the statute and which cannot be said
to be reasonably necessary or appropriate to subserving
or promoting the interests and purposes of the statute."
And, a regulation which impairs the scope of a statute
must be declared void. 145
Although Agnew involved a challenge of a Board of Equalization tax
policy and not of a regulation, the California Supreme Court stated that
the principles delimiting the scope of agency regulations "are equally
applicable to an administrative agency policy which has the effect of a
regulation."' 146
Agency regulations, as well as legislative enactments, channel the
scope of permissible adjudicatory discretion. As the California Law Re-
vision Commission comment to Section 11425.60 states, "[a]n agency
may not by precedent decision revise or amend an existing regula-
tion .... " 147 This principle comports with the APA rulemaking regime,
which mandates formal notice and comment procedures for the amend-
143. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11342.2 (Deering 1997).
144. 981 P.2d 52 (Cal. 1999).
145. Id. at 59 (citation omitted); see also, Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. California,
20 P.3d 533 (Cal. 2001); Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Dep't of Developmental Servs., 696
P.2d 150, 153-55 (Cal. 1985) (explaining, "[I]f, in interpreting the statute, the court deter-
mines that the administrative action under attack has, in effect, '[altered] or [amended] the
statute or [enlarged] or [impaired] its scope,' it must be declared void.) (citations omitted.).
Thus, if the court concludes that the administrative action transgresses the agency's statutory
authority, it need not proceed to review the action for abuse of discretion; in such a case,
there is simply no discretion to abuse." Id.
146. Agnew, 981 P.2d at 59.
147. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11425.60 cmt. (West Supp. 2001).
Illumidnating A Bureaucratic Shadow WorldFall 2001
278 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 21-2
ment as well as adoption and repeal of a regulation.
148
The principle expressed in the Law Revision Commission comment
to Section 11425.60 forbids an administrative construction that impairs
the scope of an agency regulation. 149 For example, in Carmona v.
Division of Industrial Safety, 150 the California Supreme Court annulled
the agency's overly restrictive interpretation of its own workplace safety
regulation. 15 1 The regulation governed the use of hand tools in the
workplace and provided, "[h]and tools shall be kept in good condition
and be safely stored. Unsafe hand tools shall not be used." 152 The
agency adopted the regulation under its mandate to implement Califor-
nia Labor Code provisions requiring California employers to do
"every... thing reasonably necessary to protect the life and safety of
employees."' 153 The petitioners included a group of farm workers who
sought to have the agency apply the hand tool regulation to prohibit em-
ployers from requiring workers to use short-handled hoes. 
154
The hoes had handles approximately twelve inches long, which re-
quired workers to continuously stoop close to the ground when they
used the hoes. 155 At the administrative hearing, medical experts testified
that most workers who used the hoes over an appreciable length of time
sustained severe cumulative back injuries. 156 The growers claimed the
employees could not effectively weed the fields with long-handled
hoes. 157 The agency decided that the hand tool regulation did not apply
to short-handled hoes based on its conclusion the regulation's ban of
"unsafe hand tools" applied only to "inherently dangerous" tools, and
not to tools that posed a danger from the manner of their use. 158 The
California Supreme Court, exercising its authority to interpret the
regulation as a matter of law, found from the "comprehensive sweep" of
the workplace safety statutes and the "clear language" of the regulation,
that the agency had given the rule an unduly narrow interpretation.
159
148. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11346-11347.3 (West 2001).
149. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.60 cmt. (West Supp. 2001).
150. 530 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1975).
151. Id. at 162.
152. Id. at 163.
153. Id. at 162.
154. Id. at 162-63.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 163.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 166-67.
Commenting on the agency's interpretation, the court stated:
The agency's terminology is far from self-explanatory.
Although the decision purports to draw a distinction be-
tween tools which are "inherently dangerous" and those
which are only dangerous because of their "use," as a
practical matter almost all "unsafe" tools are only unsafe
when used and would not constitute an "inherent danger"
if not in use. 160
The court interpreted the regulation to apply to "any hand tool which
causes injury, immediate or cumulative, when used in the manner in
which it was intended to be used . -161 The court stated, "[I]f the
short-handled hoe is so designed that it can be used by the worker only
in a bent over posture that is dangerous to his health it could be found to
be an 'unsafe hand tool.' 162
The line between a permissible interpretation and a prohibited
amendment or revision often presents a faint boundary. As illustrated by
Carmona, the courts apply established canons of construction to deter-
mine whether an adjudicative decision crosses the line. 163 In Montgom-
160. Id. at 166 n.7.
161. Id. at 167-68.
162. Id. at 168.
163. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1329 (9th Cir.
1982). The court stated:
Thus, to determine if the choice of procedure made by the agency was an abuse of
discretion, we look, in part, to the extent that the standards applied in the adjudi-
cation vary from the plain language of the rule. We also look at the agency's prior
use of rulemaking and the current adjudication to see if the agency's conduct in
the latter is consistent with the proceedings in the former. In Patel v. INS, we
noted that "by adjudication, the Board attempted to add a requirement to the 1973
regulation which had been expressly discarded during its rule-making proceed-
ings." That inconsistent behavior by the INS was significant in our decision to re-
verse the agency's ruling on the requirements of the regulation at issue there.
Id.
The California courts give great weight to an agency's construction of its own regulations,
but the ultimate resolution of the purpose and scope of a regulation rests with the courts.
See, e.g., Brown v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 606, 615 (Ct. App.
2000); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381, 385 (Ct. App.
1999); Yamaha Corp. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 960 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Cal. 1998). The
court in Yamaha stated:
Courts must, in short, independently judge the text of the statute, taking into ac-
count and respecting the agency's interpretation of its meaning, of course,
whether embodied in a formal rule or less formal representation. Where the
meaning and legal effect of a statute is the issue, an agency's interpretation is one
among several tools available to the court. Depending on the context, it may be
helpful, enlightening, even convincing. It may sometimes be of little worth. Con-
sidered alone and apart from the context and circumstances that produce them,
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ery Ward, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the reviewing
court's inquiry also considers regulated parties' reasonable pre-
adjudication understanding of the rule at issue: 164
Adjudication allows an agency to apply a rule to particu-
lar factual circumstances and to provide an interpretation
of the required conduct in light of those circumstances.
An adjudicatory restatement of the rule becomes an
amendment, however, if the restatement so alters the re-
quirements of the rule that the regulated party had inade-
quate notice of the required conduct. An amendment is
proper only when adequate notice is provided to affected
parties pursuant to appropriate rule-making proce-dures. 165P
B. Retroactivity
166
Adjudicatory lawmaking by the courts and administrative agencies
generally operate retroactively. 167 As Professors Davis and Pierce state,
"[t]he judicial practice of retroactive lawmaking is not limited to the
common law. Every time a court changes the meaning it attaches to a
statute or to a provision of the Constitution and applies that new mean-
ing to the case before it, the court has engaged in retroactive lawmak-
ing."168 Similarly, an agency engages in retroactive adjudicatory law-
agency interpretations are not binding or necessarily even authoritative. To quote
the statement of the Law Revision Commission in a recent report, "The standard
for judicial review of agency interpretation of law is the independent judgment of
the court, giving deference to the determination of the agency appropriate to the
circumstances of the agency action."
Id. (citations omitted).
164. Montgomery, 691 F.2d at 1332.
165. Id. at 1329.
166. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Ap-
proach, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1997) ("Legislative retroactivity raises two distinct
analytical issues: the existence of legal limitations on legislative power to regulate retroac-
tively, and the interpretive principles to be used in assessing the extent to which legislation
should be construed as retroactive.").
167. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 n.23 (1994) ("The terms
'retroactive' and 'retrospective' are synonymous in judicial usage .... They describe acts
which operate on transactions which have occurred or rights and obligations which existed
before passage of the act.") (quoting 2 N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 41.01 (5th rev. ed. 1993); Borden v. Div. of Med. Quality, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905, 908
(Ct. App. 1994) (defining retroactivity in substantially similar terms).
168. 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 6.6 at 256 (3d ed. 1994). The presumption that judicial decisions apply retroactively
is well established. See, e.g., Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 772 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Cal.
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making whenever it announces an initial interpretation, declares a new
regulatory standard, or changes a previous construction. Chenery II and
Bell Aerospace established that agencies have retrospective adjudicatory
lawmaking authority as an incident of their mandate to administer legis-
latively created programs.169 The courts continue to follow the holdings
of those two cases. 17 0 In Molina v. INS, 17 1 the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit stated, "[r]etroactive application of agency interpretations
developed through adjudication is not automatically unlawful. To the
contrary, retroactive application of new principles in adjudicatory pro-
1989) ("The general rule that judicial decisions are given retroactive effect is basic in our
legal tradition. We recently reiterated in Evangelatos v. Superior Court, Justice (now Chief
Justice) Rehnquist's observation that '[the] principle that statutes operate only prospectively,
while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student."') (quoting
United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1988) (citations omitted). In Harper v.
Virginia Dep 't of Taxation, Justice Thomas, for a five-Justice majority, wrote:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is
the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive ef-
fect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.
Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). Under the Supremacy Clause, the
Harper Court's formulation of the retroactivity rule applies to interpretations of federal law
by the federal and state courts. Id. at 100. Harper suggests, however, that states may enjoy a
greater degree of freedom to limit the retroactive operation of their interpretations of state
law. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
169. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974).
170. But cf Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66.
[Tihe presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurispru-
dence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elemen-
tary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity
to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly;;settled expec-
tations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the "principle that the le-
gal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed
when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." In a free, dy-
namic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by
a rule of law that gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their
actions.
Id. & n.18 (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjoro, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (citations omitted). The presumption against retroactive legislation, however,
does not constitute an absolute bar. As the Landgraf Court stated:
Retroactivity provisions often serve entirely benign and legitimate purposes,
whether to respond to emergencies, to correct mistakes, to prevent circumvention
of a new statute in the interval immediately preceding its passage, or simply to
give comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers salutary. However, a
requirement that Congress first make its intention clear helps ensure that Con-
gress itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential
for disruption or unfairness.
Id. at 267-68.
171. 981 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1992).
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ceedings is the rule, not the exception. And, agencies have broad legal
power to choose between adjudication and rulemaking proceedings as
vehicles for policymaking."1 72
Agency power to engage in retroactive adjudicatory lawmaking is not
absolute, however, and the question whether an agency should be al-
lowed to apply new standards and interpretations retroactively presents a
question of law. 173 As the Chenery II Court suggested, the law does not
countenance retroactive application of an adjudicatory decision where,
on balance, the "ill effect of the retroactive application" is greater than
the "mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory de-
sign or to legal and equitable principles." 174  In Bell Aerospace, the
Court intimated that retrospective adjudicatory lawmaking might consti-
tute an abuse of agency discretion if such action has the effect of sub-
stantially disarranging settled reliance interests. 175 The Court also sug-
gested retrospective adjudicatory lawmaking would warrant greater
judicial scrutiny if fines or damages were involved. 176
172. Id. at 22-23. Accord Chadmoore Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 113 F.3d 235,
240 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[A]n agency may give retroactive effect to a new policy or rule
adopted in the course of an adjudication so long as the resulting inequities are 'counterbal-
anced by sufficiently significant statutory interests."').
173. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984).
174. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202-03.
175. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 295. See also Pfaff v. Dep't of Hous. and Urban
Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 748 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) ("While some measure of retroactivity is inherent
in any case-by-case development of the law, and is not inequitable per se, this problem
grows more acute the further the new rule deviates from the one before it.").
176. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 295. See also NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355
F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966). Judge Friendly opined:
Although courts have not generally balked at allowing administrative agencies to
apply a rule newly fashioned in an adjudicative proceeding to past conduct, a de-
cision branding as 'unfair' conduct stamped 'fair' at the time a party acted, raises
judicial hackles .... And the hackles bristle still more when a financial penalty
is assessed for action that might well have been avoided if the agency's changed
disposition had been earlier made known, or might even have been taken in ex-
press reliance on the standard previously established.
Id. (citations omitted); Accord Pfaff, 88 F.3d at 747-48.
[W]e review with deference an agency's interpretation of the statute that it has re-
sponsibility to enforce, whether that interpretation emerges from an adjudicative
proceeding or administrative rulemaking .... Justice dictates, however, that our
general rule of deference to announcements of law by adjudication ha its excep-
tions. As the Supreme Court has cautioned, there may be situations where the
[agency's] reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion. Such
a situation may present itself where the new standard, adopted by adjudication,
departs radically from the agency's previous interpretation of the law, where the
public has relied substantially and in good faith on the previous interpretation,
where fines or damages are involved, and where the new standard is very broad
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Since Bell Aerospace, the United States Supreme Court has not fur-
ther delimited retroactive adjudicatory lawmaking nor has the Court
rendered a decision invalidating retroactive adjudicatory lawmaking by
administrative agencies. To screen the retroactive effects of agency de-
cisions for manifest unfairness, the federal appellate courts have ampli-
fied the balancing test framed by the Supreme Court. A number of fed-
eral circuits apply a five-part analysis to determine whether to make an
exception to the general rule of retroactivity:
(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression,
(2) whether the new rule presents an abrupt departure
from well established practice or merely attempts to fill a
void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which
the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on
the former rule, (4) the degree of the burden which a ret-
roactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory
interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a
party on the old standard.
177
Professor Luneburg states that the test devised by the federal appellate
courts allows a reviewing court to give due consideration both to private
reliance-induced interests and the public interest in the need for regula-
tion. Luneburg explained:
This equitable formula focuses attention on the degree of
"surprise," the harm to the party burdened by the new
policy, and the need, in terms of fulfilling the statutory
goal, for retroactive effect. The test permits a flexibility
that invites close case-by-case inquiry instead of broad
generalization. Accordingly, where, for example, the
burden imposed by a new rule on a party is minimal, the
required showing in terms of statutory need would be
similarly reduced. 78
and general in scope and prospective in application.
Id. (citations omitted).
177. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390; (D.C. Cir.
1972); NLRB v. Oakes Mach. Corp., 897 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 1990); Seldovia Native Ass'n
v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Kieran Ringgenberg, United
States v. Chrysler: The Conflict Between Fair Warning And Adjudicative Retroactivity in
D.C. Circuit Administrative Law, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 914 (1999) (discussing judicial review
under retroactivity principles and the fair warning doctrine).
178. William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 106, 113 (1991).
Fall 2001 Illuminating A Bureaucratic Shadow World
284 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 21-2
If the agency or a reviewing court decides a new administrative inter-
pretation or new regulatory principle should apply prospectively only,
the agency may, if otherwise warranted and proper, so limit its decision
or, preferably, implement the new law through notice and comment
rulemaking procedures. 17
9
CONCLUSION
The California APA authorizes state agencies to evolve policy and
law through rulemaking and adjudication, leaving the question of proc-
ess choice to the sound discretion of administrators. 180 Where adminis-
trators have the power to choose, the overwhelming balance will gener-
ally favor regulations over case-by-case lawmaking, for reasons
articulated by Justice Douglas in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.:181
The rule-making procedure performs important func-
tions. It gives notice to an entire segment of society of
those controls or regimentation that is forthcoming. It
gives an opportunity for persons affected to be heard....
Agencies discover that they are not always repositories
of ultimate wisdom; they learn from the suggestions of
outsiders and often benefit from that advice. This is a
healthy process that helps make a society viable. The
multiplication of agencies and their growing power make
them more and more remote from the people affected by
what they do and make more likely the arbitrary exercise
of their powers. Public airing of problems through rule
making makes the bureaucracy more responsive to pub-
179. See, e.g., Citicorp N. Am., Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (Ct.
App. 2000) (upholding a State Board of Equalization decision declaring non-retroactive a
change in the Board's interpretation of the state tax code).
180. A choice exists only among agencies with integrated rulemaking and adjudicatory
powers. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144
(1991); Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Dep't
of Labor, 519 U.S. 248 (1997). Some state regulatory schemes allocate enforcement and
adjudicatory powers between externally separate bodies. For example, the California Un-
employment Insurance Appeals Board, which adjudicates appeals of California Employment
Development Department benefit rulings, has authority to implement substantive policy
through adjudication but not rulemaking. The power to adopt substantive regulations gov-
erning the state unemployment insurance program is vested in the Employment Develop-
ment Department. For a discussion of internecine policy clashes that sometimes occur be-
tween the administrative and adjudicatory bodies of split-function agencies see Michael
Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication Fundamen-
tals, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1161-64 (1992).
181. 394 U.S. 759, 775-80 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
lic needs and is an important brake on the growth of ab-
solutism in the regime that now governs all of us ....
Rule making is no cure-all; but it does force important
issues into full public display and in that sense makes for
more responsible administrative action.182
The California Law Revision Commission comments regarding Sec-
tion 11425.60 envisage administrative case-made laws generally as im-
permanent measures, to be displaced where possible by formally-
adopted regulations: "[A]gencies are encouraged to express precedent
decisions in the form of regulations, to the extent practicable." 183 The
Commission comment reveals a legislative policy favoring the use of
both adjudication and rulemaking as interrelated and complementary
powers. Accordingly, the revised APA preserves agency discretion to
choose the method of evolving policy, but evinces the clear intent to
prohibit administrators from using adjudication to evade formal notice
and comment rulemaking procedures.
The rulemaking process subjects agency discretion to rigorous statu-
tory standards and permits wide public participation. 184 APA rulemak-
182. Id. at 777-79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
One purpose of the APA is to ensure that those persons or entities whom a regula-
tion will affect have a voice in its creation as well as notice of the law's require-
ments so that they can conform their conduct accordingly. The Legislature
wisely perceived that the party subject to regulation is often in the best position,
and has the greatest incentive, to inform the agency about possible unintended
consequences of a proposed regulation. Moreover, public participation in the
regulatory process directs the attention of agency policymakers to the public they
serve, thus providing some security against bureaucratic tyranny.
Accord Tidewater Marine W., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 927 P.2d 296, 303-04 (Cal. 1996).
See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 65-68 (1971) ("The procedure
of administrative rulemaking is in my opinion one of the greatest inventions of modern gov-
ernment.").
183. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.60 cmts. (West Supp. 2001). The Commission com-
ment was drawn from Section 2-104 (4), of the 1981 Model Administrative Procedure Act,
which declares that each agency shall "as soon as feasible and to the extent practicable,
adopt rules to supersede principles of law or policy lawfully declared by the agency as the
basis for its decisions in particular cases." Administrative Procedure Act § 2-104(d), 15
U.L.A. 1 (1990). See also Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act on California's New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 297, 303-
22 (1996) (for a discussion of the Model Act's contribution to California procedure).
184. In Tidewater Marine W., the California Supreme Court summarized the APA
rulemaking process as follows:
The agency must give the public notice of its proposed regulatory action ...
issue a complete text of the proposed regulation with a statement of the reasons
for it... ; give interested parties an opportunity to comment on the proposed regu-
lation ... ; respond in writing to public comments...; and forward a file of all
materials on which the agency relied in the regulatory process to the Office of
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ing standards mandate regulations that are consistent with statutory au-
thority, necessary, clearly expressed, and not duplicative of existing
law. 185 The adjudicatory lawmaking process, on the other hand, lacks
the explicit statutory safeguards inherent in rulemaking and operates
largely undetected outside the administrative tribunal. Nevertheless, as
the Supreme Court stated in Chenery II, effective administration may
demand the incremental, case-by-case evolution of policies to address
specialized and unforeseen problems. 186
Although lacking the strict formative standards that govern rulemak-
ing, APA adjudication procedures supply adequate tools for well-
informed policymaking. The adversarial hearing process contemplated
by the APA facilitates a comprehensive hearing record, which the
agency has significant powers to enhance. The APA permits employees
or representatives of the litigant agency to assist the presiding officer in
evaluating the evidence 187 and to give advice to the presiding officer
Administrative Law ....
Tidewater Marine W., 927 P.2d at 303 (citations omitted). Recent California legislation en-
hances APA notice and comment procedures by giving agencies discretion to deliver and
receive information regarding proposed regulations by electronic mail or facsimile. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 11340.85(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2001). The legislation also requires every
agency that maintains an Internet Web site to post to the site specified information about
proposed regulations. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11340.85(c) (West Supp. 2001).
185. CAL. GOV'T CODE §11349.1(a) (West Supp. 2001); CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 1, § 1, et
seq.
186. See generally David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REV. 921 (1965); Michael Asimow, To-
ward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication Fundamentals, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1159 (1992) (arguing that agencies need adjudicatory lawmaking au-
thority to address legal and policy issues for which statutes and regulations provide no clear
roadmap solution). Asimow states:
Everyone agrees that it is desirable for agencies to resolve as many issues as pos-
sible through rules. However, it is not always feasible or practicable to answer
every interpretive or policy problem through rulemaking. When an agency is
newly created, or when its statute is newly amended, the agency may be quite un-
able to anticipate the problems it will face; it must fumble along from case to case
for awhile. Even after the regulatory task of the agency has become routinized,
there are always new problems, variations on old problems, unanticipated devia-
tions from the norm, and connections overlooked by the general rules. In these
situations, the agency must simply "muddle through" on a case-by-case basis.
Not every case, obviously, will be the vehicle to establish new policy or make a
fresh legal interpretation; many, perhaps most, cases will be routine applications
of well-established law and policy, but there will always be difficult cases that re-
quire policymaking.
Id. (citations omitted).
187. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11430.30(a) (West Supp. 2001).
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concerning settlement proposals. 188 Except in prosecutorial cases, the
APA permits agency employees or representatives to advise the presid-
ing officer on technical issues in the proceeding, providing that the con-
tent of the advice is disclosed on the record and the parties are given an
opportunity to address it. 189 The APA authorizes the decisionmaker to
take official notice of any generally accepted technical or scientific mat-
ter within the agency's special field and of any other fact subject to judi-
cial notice by the courts. 190 The Act empowers presiding officers to use
their experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in
evaluating the evidence. 191 It permits persons whose interests will be
substantially affected by the adjudication to intervene as parties 192 and
the agency may invite amicus curiae briefs to elicit the views of inter-
ested nonparties. Moreover, the APA provides that the agency itself
may preside at the adjudicatory proceeding. 193
In moving adjudicatory lawmaking out of the shadows, the legislature
resolved uncertainty about the incidents of administrative power and fo-
cused attention on the legitimacy of agency action. Government Code
Section 11425.60 recognizes administrative precedent as a vital instru-
ment to articulate and structure administrative discretion and to evolve
agency interpretive law rationally and openly. 194 Precedent decision au-
thority enhances the complement of entrusted statutory powers that per-
mit agencies to adjust regulated interests and channel social change eq-
uitably, efficiently, and purposefully. Toward those goals, administrators
have a responsibility to exercise the powers granted by Section 11425.60
judiciously, incorporating into the decisionmaking
188. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11430.30(b) (West Supp. 2001).
189. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11430.30(c)(1) (West Supp. 2001) (providing that the excep-
tions to the rule forbidding ex parte communications apply only where the assistant or advi-
sor has not served as an investigator, prosecutor, or advocate in the proceeding or during its
preadjudicative stage).
190. CAL. GOV'TCODE § 11515 (West 1992).
191. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11425.50(c) (West Supp. 2001).
192. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11440.50 (West Supp. 2001).
193. CAL. GOv'TCODE §§ 11405.80, 11517 (West Supp. 2001).
194. Michael Asimow, Speed Bumps on the Road to Administrative Law Reform in
California and Pennsylvania, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 229, 256 (1999) ("The availability of
precedent decisions helps create a real system of administrative common law in which the
law can be developed in a logical case-by-case manner and in which everyone will have
equal access to agency law.").
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process thoughtful consideration of the precedential value of agency ad-
judicative decisions. A system of publicly accessible precedent deci-
sions will advance the goals of equity and consistency in adjudicatory
decisionmaking, promote agency accountability, and facilitate public
and agency compliance with regulatory policies. 195
195. Daniel J. Gifford, Discretionary Decisionmaking in the Regulatory Agencies:
A Conceptual Framework, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 101 (1983). Gifford said:
To the extent that a rule or precedent facilitates socially useful behavior and
thereby eliminates the need for many particularized enforcement proceedings, the
issuing agency also beneficially conserves its enforcement resources for other
uses. Indeed, any agency decision which contributes to the consistency of the
agency's regulatory approach and to improving the coherence of the regulatory
scheme administered by it helps further regulatory goals by facilitating overall
compliance with these goals by the regulated public.
Id. at 109.
